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The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue. The attack is also possible on implementations of SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 that incorporate countermeasures to previous padding oracle attacks. Variant attacks may also apply to non-compliant implementations.

As it is not possible to determine whether a specific SSL product, or if a vulnerable version of such a product is active on the endpoint, all SSL endpoints running CBC cipher suites are flagged as potentially vulnerable; as such they should be investigated by the end user.

Solution provided by LGMS :

The following list shows for which version patches were released. Install the patched version or the latest version.
OpenSSL: 1.0.1d, 1.0.0k and 0.9.8y
NSS: 3.14.3
GnuTLS: 2.12.23, 3.0.28 and 3.1.7
PolarSSL: 1.2.5
CyaSSL: 2.5.0
MatrixSSL: 3.4.1
BouncyCastle: 1.48
Oracle (Java): http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpufeb2013update-1905892.html

If patches are not available, configure the server to use GCM ciphers and disable CBC ciphers. In other words, use Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), e.g. AES-GCM, AES-CCM.

'TLSv1.2 Ciphers:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256